The Indian Christians collected evidence of attacks and eyewitness testimonies on their own but from the beginning they insisted on making reliable assessment by the state and national authorities and conducting independent investigation by the CBI. 3 In spite of these appeals, to examine the Orissa issue one-man commission under the retired judge Sarat Chandra Mohapatra was appointed. Till now (three years after the events), the commission has not submitted any report. The victims of the attacks do not believe that the judge is able to conduct an independent investigation. 4 They do not trust the state authorities and local judiciary, which are associated with the circles inspiring the attacks. 5 The vice-chairperson of the National Commission for Minorities held a tree-day visit to the riots affected area. The result of his visit was a several page report that contains general guidelines for the state and national authorities rather than objective data. 6 In August and the beginning of September 2008, non-governmental organizations created teams to collect directly on-site data of the events and from eyewitness living in refugee camps. 7 The task was not easy. In the initial period of riots, the most affected areas were not accessible due to transport obstacles and restrictions imposed for safety reasons. The team members had restricted access to the refugee camps. What is more, they faced violations and were threatened. 8 Despite these difficulties they collected huge material containing testimonies, interviews and their own observations. Among the NGOs engaged in these efforts there are organizations directly connected with Christian churches 9 and other institutions fighting for human rights or associating public trust people like scholars, lawyers, social activists, etc. 10 This paper is an attempt to compare the data from various reports and official statistics. It is worth noting that the records of the NGOs give a quite coherent picture of the events.
The background of the conflict In India attacks on Christians are not a new phenomenon but the range of the last Orissa events was unprecedented in the history of Indian Christianity.
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According to the Asian Centre for Human Rights it was "the single largest attack on any religious group in the world in 2008." 12 The history of after-independence communal tensions in Orissa indicates their strong correlation with the activities of the right-wing Hindu organizations such as the RSS, the VHP, Bajrang Dal, the BJP and others in that area. 13 14 Furthermore, in the 1990s more cases of attacks on Christians were reported in that area according to the BJP note concerning an increasing support on the national level. 15 The direct prelude to the events of August 2008 was the attacks on Christians during the Christmas of 2007. However, even before that there were sufficient alarming signals. In 2006, the Indian People's Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights created a report, which says, "The inculcation of hatred toward minorities in Orissa is deep, so much so that, in the event of another massacre, there will be little hesitation in the execution of the most brutal acts." 16 The anti-Christian and anti-Muslim campaigns of hatred conducted over the years by Hindu organizations created a sense of threat from the minority communities in the minds of local people. 17 For years Sangh Parivar leaders have spoken about a dangerous rapid growth of the Christian and Muslim population, using false statistics. They have presented missionary activities as dangerous for the indigenous culture and accused them of forced conversions. 18 Meanwhile, since the introduction of the Orissa anti-conversion law in the 1960s up no one has been sentenced under this act up till now.
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As reports emphasise, apart from the long-term propaganda of the Hindu fundamentalist groups an additional factor conducive to the development of communal tensions in Orissa is the socio-economic situation in the region.
20
It fosters corruption and creates criminogenic links between politicians, local businesses and the criminal underworld. Orissa's land shape and inaccessibility forms an image of the region as terra incognita. 21 Nowadays it is one of the poorest regions in India. A large part of the society is the population belonging to the so-called Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Scheduled Castes (SC) -groups exposed to social and economic discrimination. According to the 2001 Census, in Orissa they made up around 14 million (36%). In that group there are 8,145, 081 (22.1%) people with the ST certificate. 94.5% of them live in villages and only 15% work outside agriculture. 22 The tribal population is located mainly in the hilly and jungle areas and is concentrated in two belts -in the north (districts: Majurbhanj, Keonjahr, Sundargarh) and in the south (Koraput, Ganjam, Phulbani). 23 The statistical data show a high poverty rate and low education level among them. 24 The Scheduled Casts population in Orissa is 6, 082, 063, constituting 16% of the total population. 25 As for the Scheduled Tribes, they also live mainly in villages (88.4%) and suffer from limited development opportunities. According to Sathianathan Clarke, the areas (like Orissa) inhabited by the Adivasis and Dalits are more often places of communal riots inspired by Hindu fundamentalists. 26 But as mentioned above, the poor and backward population susceptible to influences is just an additional factor of tensions in Orissa. The necessary condition was long-term activities of the organizations affiliated to Sangh Parivar. 27 Also the HRLN opposes overestimating the role of economic factors, writing, 'In fact, 96% of the victims of the violence are illiterate and there is no evidence that, once converted people gain any economic advantage over their Hindu neighbors.' 28 According to the authors of the Society of Threatened Peoples' reports, a proof of that is the fact that in regions with the same or even a greater prevalence of SC and ST and less operation of the Hindutva activists there are no conflicts on religious ground. 29 The significant impact of fundamentalist propaganda and the fact that Christians were the only victims of the August attacks -according to the authors of the reports -indicate clearly the primarily religious nature of the conflict. 30 In the interim report prepared by the Concerned Citizens Independent Fact-Finding Mission it is written, 'We saw several villages with Christian houses gutted but did not see any Hindu houses that were gutted. Several churches were extensively damaged. This also shows the intensity and nature of the one-sided orchestrated attacks.'
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But the nature of the Orissa events remains still controversial in India. Some media and officials suggest that riots did not have a religious but ethnic background with the main role of Kui-Pana conflict. 32 was a very controversial figure. Before his assassination many criminal cases were pended against him. 38 There were nine unsuccessful attempts against Swami's life. Two days before his assassination he reported to have received an anonymous threatening letter to the police and requested additional protection. 39 Immediately, Duna Keshav Rao alias Azad, a leader of the Maoist People's Liberation Guerrilla Army, claimed responsibility for the murder on 9 September. Orissa's Naxal spokesperson Sabyasachi Panda confirmed it in his official statement. 40 Both were charged with the crime. On 17 October the State Crime Branch of the Police affirmed the participation of Central Committee of Communist Party of India (Maoist) in Swamiji's murder. 41 But the members of Sangh Parivar rejected those claims accused Christians of the crime, and promised revenge. 42 On 25 August -the day of the funeral, Sangh Parivar announced a general strike across the state. Under the leadership of BJP, RSS and VHP the 150 km long procession with body of Laxmananada was organised. 43 The NGOs underline the fact that along the route there were the largest numbers of acts of aggression against Christians.
44 Dhirendra Panda notes the lack of the state government response to the Sangh Parivar decisions. It recognises many serious failures of the authorities, like giving permission to participate in the funeral by Praveen Togadia, the International General Secretary of VHP involved in the Gujarat riots and having an entry ban to many states of India or one day after Swami's body was transferred by Nikhil Kumar Kanodia -the police superintendent who declared to calling Christians' persecutors to account. cit., p. 13. As for "Kalinga Times" suspension of Kanodia was associated with the lack of the reaction of the Kandhamal police on the request of Laxmananda to strengthen his security, the result of which was the assassination of Swami. See: "Kandhamal SP placed under suspension," "Kalinga Times," August 24, 2008, The scenario of attacks, described by witnesses in different reports, is the same. A mob consisting of several dozen to several hundred of people usually under the influence of alcohol armed with lathes, guns, axes, spears, knives, crowbars etc. came to the village. The attackers shouted the slogans, 'Jai Shri Ram' (Long life to Rama), 'Jai Bajrang Dal' (Long life to Bajrang Dal), 'Bharat Mata ki Jai' (Long life to Mother India), etc., calling 'If you remain Christians, we will kill you.' 46 Some of them wore saffron bands and flags. According to the victims, the mob was headed by the local RSS and Bajrang Dal activists or by some unknown outsiders probably the members of Sangh Parivar from the other districts and states. The attackers damaged and burnt Christians' houses, places of worship, institutions and convents. It was enough to smash the roof of a house and then a monsoon finished the act of destruction. Household equipment was removed outside, put in piles and set in fire. Domesticated animals were stolen or killed; crops were robbed or completely destroyed. 47 During the clashes more than 4,000 Christian houses were affected. Following the state data exactly 4,818 houses were destroyed (including 1,428 completely damaged). 48 (Janvikas 56 ). The Janvikas records say that also around 100-250 religious institutions and 267 churches were damaged, 57 according to the Open Door -250 churches, 58 the GfbV -151 churches, the AICC -149 churches and 13 schools, 59 the HART -117 churches, 60 the CLA -100 churches and 20 other institutions, 61 the CBCI -96 churches and 14 priests' and nuns' residences and training centres 62 and 130-140 shops and other businesses owned by Christians (HRLN 63 ).
In their testimonies victims complained about the system of compensations. They criticized the amount of payment and maintained that in many cases the officials stated that their property was damaged partially when in fact, it was completely destroyed. 64 In some cases the barrier for the authorized to receive their compensation was that it was paid to the bank account.
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In the eyewitness testimonies collected by authors of various reports there are a lot of stories about the attackers' brutality. The victims were threatened, beaten or injured. They included children, the elderly and the disabled. 66 The Christians were burnt alive or cut into pieces. The crowd was extremely violent, particularly towards pastors, priests and nuns. 67 They suffered tortures, were humiliated and killed. Probably the most publicised story is that of Sister Meena Barwa who was raped. She and the local priest were beaten, threatened by death, half-naked brought through the village while the police was watching. The reports show just two or three cases of rapes (including Sister Barwa).
But the authors think that actually sexual abuse during the riots can be underreported because of shame and social stigma. 68 In India the context of this phenomenon was described inter alia in the memories of Sankar Sen -the long-time police officer. 69 Over the course of the August events in Orissa, according to the official data 52 people were killed, including 38 dying in communal violence, Laxmananda Saraswati with his four followers and three other victims of the Naxal terror; two policemen and four people were killed during the police intervention. 70 The relatives of the victims were paid compensations from the Chief Minister ' 74 (SCSW). The Janvikas report said about 86 killings. 75 The All Indian Christian Council reported approximately 120 victims, including six pastors and one priest.
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The Society for Threatened Peoples reports more than 60 killings 77 and the HART -65. 78 But the reports of the authors underline that establishing an exact dead toll is not easy because of heavy migrations in that period and a great number of missing people's cases. 79 The report of the CPI-ML relied on the confidential confession of the local official, maintains that as a result of the riots more than 500 people could have lost their lives. 80 The Concerned Citizens' Independent Fact-finding Mission criticises the officials for 'improper collection and recording of data.' 81 According to the Society for Threatened People 'it is clear that the attackers were not concerned with deliberately carrying out massacres and killing a large number of people. In view of the encircling of the villages and the overwhelming number of attackers it would have been easy to kill very many Christians. But the attackers were mainly concerned with spreading fear and panic and driving out the villagers.'
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The attacks forced Christians to leave their villages. Most of them took shelter in the nearby jungle rather than find a place in relief camps organised by the state government. 83 There were also some private camps -set up by the Church or individuals. Various sources claim different amounts of the refugees. According to the Status Report on Relief, Rehabilitation & Reconciliation Measures there were 25,177 refugees in 10 camps (data on 4 September). 84 NCM gives the number of 20,000 85 and the Asian Centre for Human Rights maintains that 30,000 peoples were expelled. 86 Christian sources speak about 40,000-50,000 refugees. In its annual report for 2008 the All Indian Christian Council gave 54,000 refugees, 87 the Society for Threatened People -53,000.
88 the Human Rights Law Network, 89 the Open Door, 90 the CLA 91 -5,000. The government data could be underestimated because they include only the number of refugees stationed in the official camps. 92 Whereas people who fled from persecutions were also located in the private camps, and as the reports evaluate a great part of them migrated to bigger cities and areas even out of Orissa. 93 In his summary made half a year after the August events Bishop Raphael Cheenath of Cuttuck-Bhubaneshwar said that as a result of the attacks more than 1,200 families changed their places of residence, 6,000 of the refugees lived in the Salisahi slums in Bhubaneshwar, some other worked in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Punjub. 200-300 families were still living in the private camps and more than 4,400 in tents, temporary shelters or makeshift houses. 94 The Janvikas stated in May 2009 that 2,210 families were still living in relief camps. 95 The Open Doors estimates that approximately 4,000 refugees were still in camps in August 2009. 96 The reports point out bad conditions in the relief camps -insufficient food, poor access to clean water or medical care and inadequate sanitation. 97 In one report the authors compare the Orissa relief camps to the Nazi concentration camps. 98 As the HRLN noticed, 'There are no bathing facilities in any of the camps. Residents bathe in streams or reservoirs up to 2 km away.' 99 It caused severe hardship especially for pregnant women, elderly people and children as well as created conditions for many diseases -among others the most common diarrhoea and malaria, in some cases causing death. 100 These omissions could be justified by the lack of material resources and treated as organisational shortcomings. But as the reports underline the lack of sense of security in the camps could not be treated as inadvertent. In September, 12,000 refugees left the camps for security reasons. 56 families moved to Kerala and requested for asylum there. 101 On 20 September in the Tikabali relief camp a hunger strike raised over inadequate conditions and neglect of safety issues. 102 The NGOs personnel as well as opposition parties' members were not allowed to enter the affected area.
103 But the members of Sangh Parivar had permission to conduct (even in the relief camps) pro-Hindu campaigns and reconversion ceremonies called 'homecoming.' 104 The refugees pointed out that it was a very inadequate notion because a large part of the re-converted people had never been Hindu. Some of them had been followers of tribal religions but usually they had been simply Christians by birth. 105 The reconversion ceremonies typically included the shaving of the head, making a tilak on the forehead, consuming five products of the cow: milk mixed with gee, curd, cow dung and urine, and worshipping the Hindu gods. But also other practices were described. 106 However, the leaders of the ceremonies also demanded anti-Christian acts from the new believers, such as destroying the sacred objects, e.g., status, images, Bibles, and attacks on churches.
Most reconversions during that period were forced conversions using intimidation, violence or blackmail. 107 The CBCI says that in some cases converts were offered payment in the amount of 1-1.5 thousand rupees. 108 Often accepting Hinduism was the only condition to leave the camp. But as the reports say one of the common practices in the camps was to force Christians to drop their charges before drawing out.
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The victims complained of ill-treatment by the local authorities. The police were often a silent witness to the assaults on Christians. 110 The injured were denied to lodge complaints against the attackers and they were arrested under false encounters. Meanwhile the accused stayed free. 111 According to the analysis presented in the reports, the state government was giving a silent approval stamp on all of these police actions.
112 On 18 September the central government reminded that under Article 355 of the Indian constitution the state authorities had the duty to counteract internal tensions. 113 In practice, and scientists. The latter are particularly important in the last -interpretation phase -with the aim to move attention from processes of the riot production and to transfer responsibility. All elements of riots mentioned by Brass appeared in the Orissa case: preparing, enacting, battle for interpretation as well as participation of different players -from all levels of politicians, the police, businessmen to the activists of the RSS and Bajrang Dal leading incited crowds. The dress rehearsal before the main performance was the attacks on Christians in December 2007, which were almost unnoticed by the public opinion. But this compatibility between the analysis of the Orissa riots, contained in the NGOs' reports, and Brass' scheme should be really alarming. Since he notices that in the case of communal clashes in India an interpretation phase overlapped with the preparation stage of the following attacks, it is just a matter of time until something happens.
